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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on the extent of trust in political institutions using a rich 
collection of comparable data provided by the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan 
African countries. More specifically, we set out to test the “efficient grease” hypothesis that corruption 
can strengthen citizens’ trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and 
inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this increases institutional trust. Our findings reject this 
theoretical argument. We show that corruption never produces trust-enhancing effects regardless of 
the evaluation of public service quality. The results reveal how perceived and experienced corruption 
impact negatively, but differently, on citizens’ trust in political institutions. The adverse effect of 
perceived corruption decreases with the fall in public service quality, whereas the negative effect of 
experienced corruption decreases as public service quality increases. 
Keywords: Corruption, Institutions. 
RESUME 
Cet article explore les interactions entre la confiance institutionnelle et la corruption à partir d’un riche 
corpus d’enquêtes-ménages comparables  : les enquêtes Afrobaromètre réalisées dans 18  pays 
d’Afrique sub-saharienne. Plus précisément, il teste les théories de l’ « huile dans les rouages » selon 
lesquelles la corruption peut renforcer la confiance des citoyens en leur permettant d’accéder à des 
services publics autrement inaccessibles. Nos résultats infirment clairement ces théories. Nous 
montrons que la corruption réduit clairement la confiance et ce quelque soit la qualité des services 
gouvernementaux.  Ils suggèrent toutefois que l’expérience et la perception de la corruption ont des 
effets distincts sur la confiance institutionnelle. 
Mots clés : Corruption, Institutions. 
JEL Code: D73, P48  
3 
Contents 
1  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 4 
2  “EFFICIENT GREASE” THEORY AND ITS CRITICS  ....................................................... 5 
3  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ............................................................................. 6 
3.1  Presentation of the data sets ....................................................................................................... 6 
3.2  Trust in political institutions, perception and experience of corruption, and public 
service delivery: some descriptive statistics .............................................................................. 6 
4  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS  .......................................................................... 12 
4.1  Construction of the variables ................................................................................................... 12 
4.2  Results ........................................................................................................................................ 13 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS  .................................................................................................... 19 
REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE ............................................................................... 20 
List of Tables 
Table 1:  Percentage of the population who express little or no trust in the following political institutions 
(Round 3 only) ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
Table 2:  Percentage of the population who believe that most of or all of the following people are involved 
in corruption ...................................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 3:  Percentage of the population who live in areas without the following services or amenities ........... 12 
Table 4:  Impact of corruption on the level of trust in political institutions ..................................................... 15 
Table 5:  Impact of corruption on the level of trust in political institutions ..................................................... 17 
List of Figures 
Figure 1:  Percentage of the population who express no trust in political institutions ........................................ 7 
Figure 2:  Percentage of the population who have had to pay bribe at least once in the past year  ..................... 9 
Figure 3:  Percentage of the population who find it hard to get services .......................................................... 11 
Figure 4:  Marginal effect of perceived corruption on institutional trust as public service quality 
increases ............................................................................................................................................ 18 
Figure 5:  Marginal effect of experienced corruption on institutional trust as public service quality 
increases ............................................................................................................................................ 18 
  
4 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, is widely seen today as a threat to 
democratic regimes. This view of corruption is one of the core motives underlying the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. The first line of its preamble states that corruption is a threat “to the 
stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values 
and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.” The African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption also recognises the devastating effects of 
corruption on “the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States.” Numerous 
World Development reports stress that corruption undermines state legitimacy. The 1997 report states 
that, “Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political 
legitimacy to the point where even non-corrupt officials and members of the public see little point in 
playing by the rules” (World Bank, 1997, p. 102).
 The 2002 report says, “Good governance also means 
the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the legitimacy of the 
public institutions that support markets” (World Bank, 2002, p. 99). 
An increasing number of empirical studies show the negative impact of corruption on trust in political 
institutions. Della Porta (2000) finds that corruption greatly reduces trust in governments in Italy, 
France and Germany. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) conclude that citizens living in the most corrupt 
countries of Eastern and Western Europe exhibit less trust in their political systems. A number of 
studies of the situation in Latin America (Seligson, 2002), East Asia (Chang and Chu, 2006) and 
Africa (Cho and Kirwin, 2007) come to the same conclusion. 
Such conclusions contrast sharply with an earlier body of political science and economic literature on 
corruption. “Efficient grease” and “second-best” theories long prevailed in the political science and 
economic analysis of corruption. They argue that bribery is an efficient way to reduce effective red 
tape in an environment of heavy bureaucratic burden and long delays, and therefore that corruption 
can boost economic and political development (Leff, 1964; Huntington, S. 1968). For instance in 
political science, corruption is presented as facilitating the development of political parties and the 
emergence of a stable political environment. Corruption could also increase citizens’ loyalty to and 
trust in their political institutions (Bayley, 1967; Becquart-Leclerq, 1989).  
Strictly speaking, the new body of literature on the nexus between corruption and trust does not reject 
the “grease the wheels” hypothesis and can even agree with it. To be more precise, the mere 
observation that corruption generally undermines trust in political institutions does not prevent the 
correlation from being positive for individuals faced with red tape or ill-functioning public services. 
To the best of our knowledge, attempts to specifically test the “grease the wheels” hypothesis remain 
scarce in political science. In economics, the testing of these theories has prompted intense debate. 
Méon and Sekkat (2005) address the hypothesis from a macroeconomic standpoint. They observe that 
corruption is detrimental to investment and growth everywhere, and especially so in countries with 
some other institutional deficiency. This invalidates the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, but could 
correspond to a “sand the wheels” effect of corruption. Using various measures of corruption and other 
aspects of governance, Méon and Weill (2006) repeatedly observe that corruption is always 
detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with 
efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. In the area of international trade, Lavallée 
(2006b) rejects the second-best theories that see corruption as a way “to grease the wheels of trade” 
whereas Dutt and Traca (2007) show that, while corruption impedes trade in an environment of low 
tariffs, it can create trade-enhancing effects when nominal tariffs are high.  
This paper sets out to empirically test the “efficient grease” theory using a rich collection of 
comparable household surveys conducted in 18  sub-Saharan African countries (Afrobarometer 
Survey). The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the “grease the wheels” and 
“sand the wheels” hypotheses. Section  3 presents our data and some descriptive statistics on 
corruption, trust in political institutions and public service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa. We lay out 
our empirical results in section 4 and our concluding comments are contained in section 5.  
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2  “EFFICIENT GREASE” THEORY AND ITS CRITICS 
Efficient grease theory long prevailed in political science. For many years, corruption was largely 
viewed as the “grease” that gets bureaucracy moving and, in so doing, increases the loyalty of the 
citizens (Merton, 1957; Abueva Veloso, 1966; Bayley, 1967; Nye, 1967). Corruption was seen as 
binding the society together. In a study on France, Becquart-Leclerq (1989) stated that corruption 
works like grease in the gears; it has substantial redistributive effects and is a functional substitute for 
direct participation in power. 
The main premise of “efficient grease” theory is that corruption can strengthen citizen trust since bribe 
paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and 
that this increases institutional trust. Corruption is seen as an informal institution that helps the 
functioning of formal institutions. In other words, the theory suggests that a citizen faced with ill-
functioning institutions will place greater trust in the political institutions if he knows (based on 
perception or experience) that corruption is a way to get what he wants. 
In the case of Honduras, Taylor-Robinson (2006) explains how a particular form of corruption, 
clientelism, has some positive effects on political representation. She argues that electoral incentives 
for legislators to represent local interests are weak due to Honduras’ closed-list proportional 
representation system. She finds that elected representatives from poor rural areas who sponsor pork 
barrel legislation do so mainly in response to established norms of clientelism. Without these norms, 
the legislative process might ignore poor rural districts entirely. 
Since 1990, “efficient grease” theory has been increasing challenged by both the theoretical end 
empirical literature. Critics focus mainly on the origins of political trust and the hypothesis behind 
“efficient grease” theory.  
Institutional theories suggest that political trust is a consequence, not a cause, of institutional 
performance. Trust in institutions is rationally based; it hinges on citizen evaluations of institutional 
performance. Institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate 
scepticism and distrust (Mishler and Rose, 2002). Therefore corruption, seen as a symptom of ill-
functioning institutions, can affect institutional trust either directly, via the citizen’s experience or 
perception of corruption, or indirectly, via its adverse effects on economic growth (Mauro, 1995; 
Méon and Sekkat, 2005) and development outcomes (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido Lobaton, 1999). 
Empirical studies of different world regions confirm the negative impact of corruption on institutional 
trust. Della Porta (2000) demonstrates a strong relationship in Western European countries between a 
high level of corruption and low satisfaction with democracy. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) study 16 
democracies in Eastern and Western Europe and conclude that citizens in highly corrupt countries 
value and trust their political systems less. Seligson (2002) present similar findings based on 
household surveys in four Latin American democracies (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Bolivia). Lastly, Chang and Chu (2006) find the same negative relationship in four East Asian 
countries (Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan) and hence reject the Asian corruption 
exceptionalism hypothesis. 
Moreover, the central assumption of efficient grease theory that corruption can speed up an otherwise 
sluggish bureaucracy can be overturned. Myrdal (1968) argues that corrupt civil servants can cause 
delays that would not otherwise occur just to give themselves an opportunity to extract a bribe. 
Kaufman and Wei (1999) demonstrate that corruption is an endogenous element of the regulatory 
burden set-up. Drawing on a survey of firms, they show a positive and significant correlation between 
effective red tape and the value of the bribe paid by firms. Using household surveys, Hunt and Lazlo 
(2006) and Lavallée, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006) report similar findings respectively for Peru 
and sub-Saharan African countries. 
Lastly, corruption is seen as an informal institution that helps the functioning of public services, 
especially as a mechanism for the allocation of scarce public services. Yet such a mechanism can 
erode a citizen’s institutional trust. It may well be perceived as unfair or altering the rules or norms 
that govern how individuals act in society (Bratton, 2007). As informal institutions replace formal  
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rules, citizens realize that respecting the formal rules is inefficient. Cho and Kirwin (2007) find a 
vicious circular relationship between mistrust in the state and experiences with corruption. Their 
results suggest that citizens’ experience of corruption lowers their trust in political institutions and that 
lower levels of trust are likely to increase the experience of corruption. 
Recent studies addressing the link between trust and corruption conclude that corruption alters trust in 
political institutions. To the best of our knowledge, none of them tests the central hypothesis of 
“efficient grease” theory whereby corruption can offset the adverse effects on trust of ill-functioning 
bureaucracies and public services. 
3  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1  Presentation of the data sets 
The paper’s empirical basis is found in the Afrobarometer surveys. Afrobarometer is an independent, 
non-partisan research project that measures the social and political atmosphere in Africa. The 
Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a 
regular basis. This study uses Round  2 and Round  3. The Round  2 surveys were conducted from 
May  2002 to October 2003 in 15  countries: six southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia), four eastern African countries (Uganda, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and Kenya) and five western African countries (Senegal, Mali, Cape Verde, Ghana and 
Nigeria). The Round  3 surveys were conducted from March 2005 to February 2006 in the same 
countries as in 2002, but the coverage was extended to three new countries (Benin, Madagascar and 
Zimbabwe). 
These data sets are particularly interesting for four main reasons. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, 
the corruption and trust nexus has not really been explored in full empirical fashion in these countries 
despite the fact that corruption is widespread in this area of the world
1. Secondly, these countries are 
young democracies, so an analysis of corruption’s repercussions on the consolidation of these regimes 
consolidation is particularly relevant since institutional trust and state legitimacy are key elements to 
political stability (Mishler and Rose, 2001; O’Donnell, 1999). Thirdly, the survey includes questions 
about both experiences and perceptions of corruption. So we can analyse the effects of these two 
aspects on institutional trust. Lastly, the survey also contains information about the citizens’ 
perceptions of the quality of public services. This means that we can explore the impact of corruption 
on institutional trust by extent of red tape and then rigorously test the “efficient grease” theory. 
3.2  Trust in political institutions, perception and experience of corruption, and public service 
delivery: some descriptive statistics 
In a first step, we want to know whether ordinary people express trust in their country’s political 
institutions. In the Afrobarometer surveys, citizens were asked, “How much do you trust each of the 
following institutions, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” We only consider here the 
answers given for the political institutions (i.e. the president, parliament, the independent electoral 
commission, the ruling party and the opposition parties). 
                                                      
1 The  Afrobarometer surveys cover an area of the world where corruption is widespread. None of the abovementioned countries appear 
among the world’s 20 least corrupt countries as ranked by the Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency International in 
2006. The highest ranking is Botswana, in 37
th place out of 158 countries. About half of the countries studied come in somewhere 
between 70
th and 105
th place. On the basis of the Transparency International rating, the most corrupt countries in our sample are Zambia, 
Benin, Kenya and Nigeria.  
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Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 1 shows that the people exhibit a low level of trust in their political institutions. The Round 2 
surveys reveal that a quarter of the population does not trust any political institution (i.e. they trust 
neither the president, nor parliament, the independent electoral commission, the ruling party, nor the 
opposition parties). Three years later, this proportion had fallen to 16% of the population. This positive 
development is observed in every country. But there are still major cross-national variations. Nigeria 
shows the least trust in political institutions with, in Round 2, 67% and, in Round 3, 54% of the 
population trusting none of the political institutions. In the other countries, the situation is admittedly 
less alarming. Yet even in Round 3, almost one-third of the population in Benin and Zambia trusts 
none of the political institutions. This percentage ranges from 20% to 25% in Cape Verde, Zimbabwe 
and Madagascar. Conversely, in Mozambique, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania, less than 6% of the 
population have this negative opinion of political institutions. 
The least trustworthy institutions appear to be the opposition political parties. More than 60% of the 
population expressed little or no trust in this institution compared with 40% for the ruling party and 
parliament and only 33% for the president. This relative ranking of the institutions is pretty much the 
same for all the countries studied. Except in Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe where a high level of 
distrust applies for all the institutions, the highest rates of distrust are generally observed for the 
opposition parties (the rates are extremely high in some countries, such as in Madagascar where more 
than 80% of the population said they had little or no confidence in the opposition political parties).  
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Table 1:  Percentage of the population who express little or no trust in the following political 
institutions (Round 3 only) 
 
 President  Parliament/National 
assembly 
Electoral 
Commission  Ruling party  Opposition 
political parties 
Benin 42.3  54.8  55.2  58.0  67.4 
Botswana 30.8 32.9 39.4  39.8  53.3 
Cape Verde  44.6  42.5  46.5  49.8  46.3 
Ghana 22.0  27.1  21.6  29.1  44.4 
Kenya 39.7  53.5  40.2  50.4  71.5 
Lesotho 19.2  36.3  25.6  25.0  77.7 
Madagascar 31.1  45.4  44.7  44.1  82.9 
Malawi 35.7  46.3  45.6  39.6  55.8 
Mali 17.0  23.0  35.7  28.1  47.3 
Mozambique 14.7  16.3  18.8  18.6  61.4 
Namibia 18.6  27.6 38.1  34.0  64.3 
Nigeria 75.3  78.3  79.5  78.4  76.1 
Senegal 21.8  33.2 28.9  34.0  45.8 
South Africa  29.1  38.5  36.1  36.7  67.6 
Tanzania 4.6 9.0 8.5  9.1  63.4 
Uganda 23.5  29.3  34.4  28.9  61.5 
Zambia 59.7  58.2  63.1  67.0  63.8 
Zimbabwe 68.1  63.9  69.3  68.2  51.8 
Total 33.4  39.9  41.0  41.2  61.2 
Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
In a second step, we want to assess the extent of corruption in the sub-Saharan African countries. The 
Afrobarometer surveys provide information on both experiences of petty corruption and perception of 
corruption. These two aspects could have distinct effects on institutional trust, giving us a fuller 
understanding of corruption mechanisms. 
On the question of experiences of corruption, the respondents were asked whether, in the past year, 
they actually “had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to a government official in order to: (a) get 
a document or permit (b) get a child into school (c) get household services (d) avoid a problem with 
police?” On average, approximately 20% of the population said they had to pay a bribe a least once in 
the past year, which is quite a high proportion. The average rate of 20% means that, if the process 
were evenly distributed, the entire population would be affected by corruption in just five years. 
Furthermore, this rate is much higher than on other continents. For example, in Peru and Ecuador, 
where the extent of corruption has been measured in a similar way, corruption is found to be in a 
bracket of 2% to 6% at national level (Herrera and Roubaud, 2006). Obviously, these rates are much 
lower in the developed countries. The findings of the Global Corruption Barometer survey conducted 
for Transparency International (2005) in 67  countries in 2005 shows that an average 24% of the 
population had personally experienced corruption in eight African countries in the sample compared 
with only 2% in the developed countries (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2006). This average hides 
large cross-country variations. In countries like Nigeria and Uganda, the Round 2 data finds that more 
than 40% of the population had to pay a bribe at least once. At the other end of the scale, the incidence 
of corruption is very low in Botswana where less than 5% of the population in both the Round 3 and 
Round 2 survey said they had to pay a bribe in the past year.  
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Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
As regards perception of the prevalence of the phenomenon, respondents were asked, “How many of 
the following people do you think are involved in corruption: (a) office of the presidency, (b) members 
of parliament, (c) national government officials, (d) police, (e) tax officials, (f) judges and magistrates, 
(g) teachers and school administrators?” This question seeks to find out the popular reputation of these 
service providers independently of whether an individual respondent has ever been directly 
approached for a bribe. Across all survey rounds, the most discredited institutions are the police and 
tax officials. Approximately one half of the population considers that “most” or “all” policemen and 
tax officials are corrupt. This proportion is over 60% in Benin, Uganda and Nigeria. The public 
servants perceived as the least corrupt are the teachers and school administrators. Approximately 20% 
of the population thinks that “most” or “all of them” are involved in corruption. It is worth noting that 
from 30% to 38% of the population consider that the political institutions are corrupt, singling out 
national government officials in particular.  
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Table 2:  Percentage of the population who believe that most of or all of the following people 































































































































































  R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 
Benin  56  57  64  69  85  71  22  
Botswana  19 26 24 30 33 33 33 31 25 34 17 21 14 17 
Cape  Verde  24 14 23 15 16 11 19 14 18 25 13 11 14  8 
Ghana  22 11 21 17 33 29 59 60 42 58 43 43 17 16 
Kenya  33  9  46 17 40 32 69 62 46 47 34 32  9  14 
Lesotho  9  17 15 22 27 34 40 33 25 39 15 21  9  15 
Madagascar  15  19  16  37  27  31   6   
Malawi  28 44 31 44 36 56 38 56 33 65 28 45 20 31 
Mali  31 44 38 45 42 52 57 61 65 74 62 63 21 26 
Mozambique  14 21 14 26 25 30 37 42 28 48 22 27 33 34 
Namibia  25 17 31 24 38 32 46 38 42 31 38 25 36 26 
Nigeria  57 52 62 56 61 58 76 72 60 63 43 47 38 30 
Senegal  28 20 31 27 33 36 39 48 43 56 33 40 17 13 
South  Africa  24 15 31 25 39 30 50 40 29 38 25 18 22 18 
Tanzania  9  17 14 25 16 31 42 51 30 48 34 35  9  9 
Uganda  33 35 31 31 42 52 70 70 66 59 40 43 14 14 
Zambia  36 22 42 26 42 32 72 52 59 46 33 33 22 23 
Zimbabwe  46  42  51  63  52  28  13  
Total  30 25 33 29 38 38 53 50 45 50 35 35 19 20 
Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
In a third step, we want to evaluate the quality of public service delivery in the countries studied. The 
Afrobarometer surveys cover service accessibility, proximity and availability. Service accessibility 
assesses the “user-friendliness” of the services. In other words, it gives the customer’s point of view of 
how hard it is to gain access to public services. The relevant survey question is: “In your experience, 
how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services: a place in a primary school for a child?; 
household services?; identity documents?; help from the police?” 
Figure 3 suggests that access to public services is considered to be difficult by a large number of 
citizens. On average, in 2002 and 2005, approximately 40% of the population found it “difficult” or 
“very difficult” to obtain these services. Our indicator records a slight improvement in service 
accessibility over the period. In some countries like Senegal, Botswana, Namibia and Kenya, access to 
public services seems to have improved significantly. In Senegal, 43% of the population said it was 
hard to obtain at least one of the services mentioned in 2002, whereas, only 25% expressed this 
judgement in 2005. Nevertheless, in half of the countries studied in 2002, more than 40% of the 
population said it was hard to access at least one of the services considered.  
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Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
Note: the figure shows the percentage of the population who consider that at least one of the following services (an identity document, a 
household service, help from the police, a place in primary school) is difficult or very difficult to obtain. 
As regards the proximity of service facilities in the towns and villages where people live, 
Afrobarometer measures service infrastructure in a distinctive way. In addition to the interviews of 
randomly selected individuals, the surveys include contextual observations by interviewers and 
supervisors for each primary sampling unit. Among other things, the field teams record the presence or 
absence of post offices, police stations, electricity grids, etc. (Bratton, 2007). 
Table 3 reports on the percentages of adults living in a locality without these services in each of the 
18 African countries in 2005 and 2002. These observations reveal that school is the most present 
infrastructure followed by health clinics and piped water systems. In 2005, only 23% of the population 
lived in localities without a school compared with 49% for piped water systems and 56% for health 
clinics. Countries like Senegal, Benin, South Africa and Uganda have a more physically accessible 
service infrastructure than countries like Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. For instance, in 
Lesotho, 55% of the population lives in an area without a primary school and 84% in areas where 
there are no health clinics.  
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Table  3:  Percentage of the population who live in areas without the following services or 
amenities 
 
  School  Police station  Piped water system  Health clinic 
R3 R2  R3 R2 R3 R2  R3  R2 
Benin 7    74    57    38   
Botswana 46 38  88 76  12 17  65  64 
Cape Verde  21  32  88  91  34  44  62  73 
Ghana 6  6  66  67  38  47  48  47 
Kenya 24  24  88  90  56  67  63  66 
Lesotho 55  38  92  90  34  69  84  79 
Madagascar 5    80    50    63   
Malawi 15  15  90  93  70  76  71  68 
Mali 20  34  95  85  49  69  48  62 
Mozambique 23  14  69  50  79  54  58  56 
Namibia 41  38  91  87  32  49  76  70 
Nigeria 20  9  64  53  66  51  41  30 
Senegal 7  11  64  86  21  44  31  40 
South Africa  9  17  50  50  22  18  34  41 
Tanzania 27  1 86  50  65  63  65  11 
Uganda 15  5  82  76  70  82  33  33 
Zambia 22  17  64  70  67  67  46  43 
Zimbabwe 49    92    59    77  
Total 23  20  79  75  49  55  56  52 
Sources : Afrobarometer surveys. Authors’ calculations. 
For the purpose of the analysis, therefore, we are interested in assessing the impact of the perception 
and experience of corruption on institutional trust. We will also test whether the impact of corruption 
on trust varies according to the ease of access to public services and, more specifically, whether 
corruption increases institutional trust when access to public services is difficult. 
4  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we seek to assess the impact of corruption (experienced or 
perceived) on institutional trust. Secondly, we test whether the effect of corruption on trust varies 
according to the quality of public service delivery. 
4.1  Construction of the variables 
Our dependant variable is built based on the following question in the Afrobarometer survey: “How 
much do you trust each of the following institutions, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” 
As we have already stated, in our analysis, we only consider the answers given regarding the political 
institutions (president, parliament, independent electoral commission, ruling party and opposition 
parties). We compute a composite indicator of trust, which is equal to the average of the evaluations 
given for each institution (Cornbach’s Alpha = 0.80). Scores range from 0 to 3, where the higher 
values indicate greater trust in the political institutions. 
As explained in the previous section, we use two measures of corruption. The first one concerns the 
citizens’ actual experience of petty corruption. Respondents were asked whether they had to pay a 
bribe in the past year to obtain various services. Possible answers are: never, once or twice, a few 
times, often. An average index was calculated to obtain an aggregate indicator of experience of 
corruption (Cornbach’s Alpha = 0.74 in 2005 and 0.76 in 2002). The scores range from 0 to 4, with 4 
denoting frequent experience of corruption. The second corruption index covers popular perceptions 
of the general prevalence of corruption among politicians and public officials. The scores are also on a 
0 to 4 scale, with 4 indicating a high degree of perceived corruption
2.  
                                                      
2  This is computed on the basis of questions on perceptions of corruption, as described in the previous section (Cornbach’s Alpha 
equals 0.87).  
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We also calculate an indicator that captures the ease of access to public services for each citizen based 
on the questions concerning service “user-friendliness” and proximity (Cornbach’s Alpha = 0.70). 
Greater values mean easier access to public services.  
We control the relationship between trust, corruption and public service quality with other covariates. 
First, we introduce a time and country dummy to take into account unobservable particularities.  
Secondly, we add in a set of demographic variables such as age, gender and level of education. Age 
could be an important explanatory element of trust in political institutions. Younger people might be 
expected to exhibit greater institutional trust because, unlike their elders, their experience of political 
life is recent. This means that they might not have accumulated years of disappointment in the political 
institutions and may still have an idyllic vision of democracy (Seligson, 2002). In most of the studies 
on institutional trust, gender is a key determinant of trust, with women expressing less trust in political 
institutions (Seligson, 2002; Chang and Chu, 2006). Level of education is important too. Seligson 
(2002) points out that the most educated people are more likely to have a good knowledge of their 
political system and to criticize it. In addition, we introduce a variable that reflects exposure to the 
media.  
Thirdly, we introduce variables to represent the citizens’ living conditions. This choice is driven by the 
theory of “economic vote” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000), which suggests that living conditions 
influence voting behaviour and attitudes towards governments. They consider that voters vote 
rationally and that they give their support to governments perceived as the most likely to improve their 
own living conditions. Given this, trust in political institutions depends on the citizens’ evaluations of 
their economic situation. More specifically, citizens may display higher trust in political institutions 
when they reckon that their living conditions are good or have improved. To capture the citizens’ 
living conditions, we use three Afrobarometer questions asking respondents about their expectations 
of changes in their living conditions and how they rate their living conditions compared with their 
fellow citizens and compared with twelve months previously. 
Fourthly, we look at the citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and their evaluation of changes in the 
amount of freedom they have, of ordinary people’s influence on political decisions, and of equality. 
Citizens’ attitudes are not driven purely by their living conditions, but also by “political goods” such 
as political rights and liberties. 
4.2  Results 
In a first step, we assess the basic effect of corruption on institutional trust. Table 4 presents the results 
of the estimations performed on the entire sample of Afrobarometer countries. Columns 1 and 3 report 
on the results of the ordinary least squares estimation. 
Some findings are in keeping with our expectations. The higher their level of education, the less the 
people trust the political institutions. For instance, having a post-secondary level of education rather 
than no formal education reduces institutional trust by 13% whereas having a primary school 
education only reduces trust by 7%. Our estimations show that the African citizens’ opinions of their 
political institutions are driven by both material needs and democratic values. All the variables 
describing the citizens’ living conditions and attitudes towards democracy and its outcome have a 
significant influence on institutional trust. As regards material needs, our findings suggest that the 
better the perception of living conditions and their development, the greater the trust in the political 
institutions. In terms of democratic values, our results indicate that a high level of satisfaction with 
democracy, a positive evaluation of changes in freedoms, of equality of treatment of citizens and of 
the influence of ordinary people on government decisions increase trust in the political institutions. 
For instance, the view that equality and fairness are improving raises trust by more than 20%. 
However, other findings are quite surprising, especially the demographic variable coefficients. For 
instance, we find that gender has no influence on the level of trust, but that citizens who live in urban 
areas display greater trust in political institutions. The former suggests that women have as much trust 
as their male counterparts, which is quite new in the literature. The latter is counter-intuitive as 
individuals in urban areas are more likely to have a more critical point of view. Yet this finding can be  
14 
explained by the fact that policy measures are often more beneficial to urban areas. Our regressions 
also reveal that age has little influence on trust. Only one age bracket dummy, for 18-29 year olds, is 
significant. The coefficient is negative, meaning that young people express less trust in political 
institutions. 
As regards our variables of interest, our results clearly show that perception and experience of 
corruption undermine institutional trust, and that perceived corruption has a larger negative impact 
than experienced corruption. The marginal effect (at the means) of the perception of corruption is 
-18% as opposed to -7% for experience of corruption. Our estimations also confirm that the quality of 
public service delivery increases institutional trust. Easy access to public services increases the level 
of citizens’ trust in political institutions. 
Columns 2 and 4 report on the coefficient estimates using the two-stage least squares procedure. The 
choice of this estimation technique is driven by the fact that trust in political institutions may also be a 
determinant of corruption (perceived and experienced). As explained by Chow and Kirwin (2007), 
institutional mistrust is likely to lead people to pay bribes in order to access public resources. It could 
hence increase experiences of corruption and foster the perception that corruption is widespread
3. 
We use two instruments to study the perceived level of corruption. A dummy variable, called 
“solution”, taking the value of one if the respondent says he would pay a bribe to speed up the delivery 
of a government permit or licence. Another dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent 
is the head of household. A few different instruments are used to study experiences of corruption: an 
indicator of vulnerability to illness, a variable capturing the respondent’s intensity of religious practice 
and the “solution” variable. The choice of these instruments is based on the literature on the causes of 
corruption. A respondent who considers that paying a bribe is a solution in the event of a problem with 
the administration reveals that he has no moral barriers to corruption and that his propensity to bribe is 
high. The less adverse to corruption an individual is, the more likely he is to pay a bribe and then to 
perceive that bribery is widespread. Similarly, the head of household is generally more in contact with 
the public services and therefore has a greater chance of being a victim of or witnessing corruption and 
to hence believing it is common practice. Hunt (2006) and Guiso et al. (2003) emphasise that 
vulnerability and a low intensity of religious practice increase the occurrence of corruption. 
In both cases, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test finds significant endogenous regressor (i.e. corruption) 
effects on the estimates and instrumental variables techniques are required. Furthermore, in both cases 
the Sargan test confirms that the instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term) and that 
the instruments chosen are appropriate for the estimated equation. 
This estimation technique does not make any great difference to our findings: the sign and significance 
of the coefficient estimates for most of our variables are similar to before. The coefficients of the 
corruption variables are still negative and significant, but they are larger. The marginal effects of the 
perception and experience of corruption are respectively -60% and -27% compared with -18% and 
-7% for the OLS estimations. 
                                                      
3  Numerous studies state that perception and experience of corruption are interlinked and self-reinforcing.  
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Table 4:  Impact of corruption on the level of trust in political institutions 
 
 Perceived  corruption  Experienced  corruption 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Corruption and quality of bureaucracy      
Corruption -0.18***  -0.60***  -0.07***  -0.27*** 
 [0.01]  [0.08]  [0.01]  [0.04] 
Quality of administration  0.05***  -0.01  0.07***  0.07*** 
 [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Demographic characteristics      
Urban 0.10***  0.08***  0.11***  0.11*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Woman -0.01  -0.02**  -0.01  -0.01* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
18-29 years old  -0.04***  -0.02  -0.05***  -0.05*** 
 [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
30-39 years old  -0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
 [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
40-49 years old  0.03*  0.04**  0.02  0.02 
 [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
50-59 years old  0.03  0.04**  0.02  0.02 
Ref: > 60 years old  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Level of education      
Primary -0.07***  -0.06***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Secondary   -0.11***  -0.08***  -0.12***  -0.12*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Post secondary  -0.13***  -0.08***  -0.15***  -0.14*** 
Ref: no formal education  [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
Exposure to media  -0.01** 0.01  -0.01***  -0.01 
 [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Satisfaction with democracy  0.30*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Change in freedoms  0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Living conditions compared with other people      
Same 0.02*  0.00  0.03***  0.02* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.05***  0.02**  0.06***  0.06*** 
Ref: worse  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Change in living conditions      
Same 0.03***  0.03***  0.02***  0.02* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Change in influence      
Same 0.04***  0.02  0.04***  0.04*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.08***  0.06***  0.09***  0.09*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Development of equal and fair treatment      
Same 0.12***  0.08***  0.14***  0.13*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.23***  0.15***  0.26***  0.25*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Round 2 dummy  -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.39*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Country-specific effects  YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.79*** 1.74*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 
  [0.04] [0.18] [0.03] [0.04] 
Observations  35134 33812 37135 35514 
R-squared  0.40 0.41 0.37 0.38 
Sargan statistic   1.669  4.325 
Chi-sq(1) P-val    0.19    0.12 
Wu-Hausman F test   30.38  29.41 
F(1,33770) P-value    0.00    0.00 
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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In a second step, we want to specifically test the “efficient grease” theory. We use a multiplicative 
interaction model to analyse the trust-corruption nexus. The “efficient grease” hypothesis implies that 
the relationship between institutional trust and corruption varies with the level of red tape. Now it has 
been well established that the intuition behind conditional hypotheses is captured rather well by 
multiplicative interaction models (Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006). In other words, we include in 
our regressions one corruption variable (perception of the level of corruption or experience of 
corruption), one public service quality variable and a “corruption*service quality” interaction term 
(the product of these two continuous variables). In this step, we use the same model specification as 
previously (with the same set of control variables), but the discussion here will focus mainly on the 
interaction effect.  
Table 5 reports on the coefficient estimates, but figures 4 and 5 give a clearer illustration of how the 
marginal effect of corruption on institutional trust changes with the assessment of public service 
quality. 
Our results never find a positive impact of corruption on institutional trust. Nevertheless, the effect of 
the perception that corruption is widespread and the effect of having experienced corruption are quite 
different. 
In effect, our findings indicate that the perceived level of corruption has a strong adverse effect on 
citizens’ trust in political institutions and that the scope of its negative effect increases with the quality 
of public services. This result can be seen as a partial validation of the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, 
since it shows that the negative impact of perceived corruption on institutional trust is lower in 
environments where the quality of public service delivery is low. However, this finding could be said 
to be driven by the citizens’ attrition of preferences. In other words, when public institutions are not 
performing well, corruption could be viewed as one institutional deficiency among others, so its 
impact is lesser. Conversely, when public services are deemed efficient, perceived corruption has a 
more negative effect on the citizens’ attitudes toward the institutions. In this case, corruption is 
considered to be a real problem that prevents the administration from being more effective and an 
issue that the political institutions have to address.  
The adverse impact of experienced corruption on citizens’ trust in political institutions is not as strong. 
Moreover, this negative effect falls as the level of satisfaction with public service quality increases and 
it even becomes insignificant when public services are considered quite efficient (a score of more than 
2.5.on a 3-point scale). This result suggests that the experience of corruption is considered all the more 
negative by individuals who find it hard to access public services.  
These findings underline the fact that the “objective” corruption variable (practice and actual 
experience of corruption) and the “subjective” corruption variable (perception of the level of 
corruption) reflect two different aspects of this phenomenon, and that their respective impacts merit 
separate analysis.  
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Table 5:  Impact of corruption on the level of trust in political institutions 
(multiplicative interaction model) 
 
  Perception of corruption  Experience of corruption 
OLS 2LS OLS 2LS 
Corruption and quality of bureaucracy        
Corruption -0.17***  -0.42***  -0.09***  -0.34*** 
 [0.02]  [0.08]  [0.02]  [0.07] 
Quality of administration  0.07*** 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 [0.02]  [0.04]  [0.01]  [0.02] 
Corruption*quality of administration -0.01  -0.15***  0.01  0.07 
 [0.01]  [0.03]  [0.02]  [0.06] 
Demographic characteristics        
Urban   0.10***  0.08***  0.11***  0.11*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Woman   -0.01  -0.02***  -0.01  -0.01* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
18-29 years old  -0.04***  -0.02  -0.05***  -0.05*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
30-39 years old  -0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
40-49 years old  0.03*  0.04***  0.02  0.02 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
50-59 years old  0.03  0.04**  0.02  0.02 
Ref: > 60 years old [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02] 
Level of education       
Primary -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Secondary   -0.11***  -0.08***  -0.12***  -0.12*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Post secondary  -0.13***  -0.09***  -0.15***  -0.14*** 
Ref: no formal education [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Media exposure  -0.01** 0.01*  -0.01*** -0.01 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Satisfaction with democracy  0.30*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Change in freedoms  0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Living conditions compared with other people         
Same 0.02*  0.01  0.03***  0.02* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.05***  0.03**  0.06***  0.06*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Change in living conditions        
Same 0.03***  0.02**  0.02***  0.02* 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.06***  0.05***  0.06***  0.06*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Change in influence       
Same 0.04***  0.02*  0.04***  0.04*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.08***  0.06***  0.09***  0.09*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Development of equal and fair treatment        
Same 0.12***  0.09***  0.14***  0.13*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Better 0.23***  0.16***  0.26***  0.25*** 
Ref: worse [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Round 2 dummy  -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.40*** 
 [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Country-specific effects  YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.78*** 1.51*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 
  [0.04] [0.18] [0.03] [0.04] 
Observations  35134 35681 37135 35562 
R2  0.40 0.38 0.37 0.38 
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our analysis uses a rich collection of comparable household surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan 
African countries (Afrobarometer Survey) to shed light on the link between corruption (perceived and 
experienced) and trust in political institutions. More specifically, we set out to test the “efficient 
grease” theory that corruption can strengthen citizen trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the 
door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this increases institutional 
trust. 
Our findings by and large reject this theoretical argument. Both experienced corruption and the 
perception that corruption is widespread have a negative impact on citizens’ trust in political 
institutions. We endeavour to take the observation of distrust a step further and study the extent to 
which this situation could depend on the quality of public services. An analysis of the interaction 
effect shows that the impact of corruption on institutional trust is never positive whatever the 
evaluation of public service quality. Yet the results reveal how perceived and experienced corruption 
impact differently on citizens’ trust in political institutions. The adverse effect of the perception that 
corruption is widespread is lesser when public services are hard to access; whereas the negative effect 
of experienced corruption decreases with the ease of access to public services. 
These findings call for a certain number of more detailed and expanded studies. Among the possible 
avenues of research, we would mention two. Firstly, we would like to take a more in-depth look at 
national particularities. Although this study shows that general trends can be identified, the 
characteristics of the countries studied are quite different. This is shown specifically by the descriptive 
analysis of level of corruption, level of trust in political institutions and access to public services. The 
corruption victim’s individual characteristics can also differ from one country to the next. Secondly, 
the effects of social interactions should be considered to take proper account of national environments. 
The contexts, and especially the predominant opinions and attitudes in a given society, influence 
individual attitudes towards institutions and corruption. For example, among the explanatory factors, 
macro-characteristics (overall or average result per country) should be considered using the survey 
data themselves (level of trust between individuals or percentage of those who trust their fellow 
citizens, level of disapproval of corruption, level of development, and general evaluation of the quality 
and performance of the institutions). Lastly, an analysis could be made of the changes in the extent of 
corruption and access to public services over the period studied. The aim here is to test, for example, if 
the change in the situation, rather than (or as much as) the prevailing situation, has an influence on 
attitudes towards the institutions.  
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